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Book Reviews 
THE REACH OF ABDUCTION: INSIGHT AND TRIAL 
By Dov M. GABBAY AND JOHN WOODS. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005. 
Pp. xviii, 1-476. ISBN 0-444-51791-X. Hardbound, US$160.00 
The Reach of Abduction is the second volume in a planned three-volume set-A 
Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems-spanning relevance, abduction, and 
fallacious reasoning. Despite this fact, Gabbay and Woods write in the preface that 
"we have written the individual volumes with a view to their being read either as 
stand-alone works or as linked and somewhat overlapping items in the series" (p. 
xvii). The aim of The Reach of Abduction is to embed abduction "within a practical 
logic of cognitive systems" and in so doing, provide "an adequate stand-alone 
characterization of abduction itself' (p. 9). At the same time, Gabbay and Woods 
admit this work is only meant to be "an enterprise of first words rather than last" (p. 
xviii). Indeed, this tentativeness gets expressed again and again throughout the 
book-here is but one example: "Much of what we will have to say for ourselves 
here and in the book's succeeding chapters will be fragmentary, tentative, 
programmatic and promissory" (p. 7\). 
The book is divided into three sections. Part I, comprised of the first two chapters, 
is a general introduction to the framework within which they will be studying the 
problem of abduction, i.e., their general theory of a practical logic of cognitive 
systems-hence we get a brief articulation of what the authors mean by 'logic', 
'practical' and 'cognitive system,' etc. Part II, comprised of chapters 3 - 9 and more 
than half of the bo'ok, is devoted to articulating and discussing various conceptual 
models of abduction. Part III, comprised of chapters 10- 13, is devoted to presenting 
and discussing formal models of abduction. (The third part of the book, like the 
second part, is titled "Conceptual Models of Abduction"-just one of a frustratingly 
high number of typographical and copy-editing errors.) 
In Chapter I, which is a seven-page introduction, Gabbay and Woods provide 
a brief articulation and justification of the presuppositions that will ground their 
approach to abduction. Most significantly, they construe 'logic' quite broadly "as 
the disciplined description of the behaviour of real-life logical agents" (p. I) such 
that they "propose to absorb the logic of linguistic structures into a more 
comprehensive logic of agency" (p. 2). Hence, while they acknowledge that their 
main technical thrust will be via formal models rather than computational 
implementation, they point out that the reach of their "models extends beyond sets 
of properties of agent-independent systems" (p. 4). 
In Chapter 2, Gabbay and Woods, provide a brief discussion of what they mean 
by 'practical logic' and 'cognitive system'. (They also point the reader to Chapters 
2 and 3 of the first book in the series, Agenda Relevance, for a more detailed 
account.) The core of the discussion surrounds the following two definitions: 
Definition 2.1 (Cognitive Systems) A cognitive system CS is a triple X. 
R. A of a cognitive agent X, cognitive resources R, and a cognitive 
agenda A executed in real time. 
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Definition 2.2 (Practical logics, a first pass) A practical logic is a 
systematic account of aspects of the behaviour of a cognitive system in 
which X is a practical agent. (p. 10) 
According to Gabbay and Woods, "an agent is a practical agent to the extent 
that it commands comparatively few cognitive resources in relation to comparatively 
modest cognitive goals," (p. 12) and "practical reasoning is reasoning done by a 
p~actical agent" (p. 12). Note that what Gabbay and Woods mean by practical 
reasoning or practical logic is not what many philosophically oriented readers 
might first think of-i.e., as reasoning concerning action as opposed to reasoning 
concerning knowledge (see, for example, Audi, Practical Reasoning). According 
to Gabbay and Woods, it is the type of agent, not the task to which the reasoning 
is devoted, that makes reasoning or logic practical rather than theoretical. "Our 
interpretation of the practical-theoretical dichotomy may strike the reader as 
nonstandard, if not eccentric .... We are prepared to put up with the nonstandardness 
in return for conceptual yield" (p. 13). The chapter is then devoted to discussions 
and examples of how practical agents differ from theoretical agents, with particular 
attention to the sorts of inference strategies practical agents adopt in order to 
minimize the expenditure of their limited cognitive assets. 
Chapter 3 is the most crucial chapter of the book and is devoted to an initial 
articulation of the authors' conception of abduction. According to Gabbay and 
Woods, abduction is the finding and engaging of a hypothesis (H) that, when 
combined with what one already knows (K), enables one to presumptively attain a 
cognitive target (T) that one could not attain via K (or a ready expansion of K) 
alone. (p. 47) Engaging an hypothesis is a two-part task comprised of (a) holding 
that H is worthy of conjecture and (b) releasing H for possible use as premise in 
future reasoning (p. 69). Finding an hypothesis involves two general tasks, (a) 
originating the candidate space of potential hypotheses and (b) cutting the candidate 
space down to, hopefully, a successful H. The authors do not separate out the 
finding of H quite this explicitly, but tend to weave the two tasks together-most of 
the emphasis in this chapter is placed on the cutting down task and the logical 
resources that will need to be brought to bear on describing the behaviour involved 
in this task-hence Gabbay and Woods argue that an abductive logician will need 
to deploy the resources of the appropriate logics of relevance and plausibility (p. 
57). A crucial condition on H, according to Gabbay and Woods, is that H only 
allows the presumptive attainment of T. Since T cannot be achieved via what one 
knows or what one can readily add to what one knows, H has a lesser epistemic 
status than the abducer may have originally hoped for when trying to attain T. 
Hence, the authors claim, "the fundamental conceptual fact about abduction is that 
abduction is ignorance-preserving reasoning" (p. 40). Fully generalized, the claim is 
that abduction is cognitive-deficit preserving (p. 45). 
Intertwined with the presentation of their own schema of abduction is a 
discussion of "the dominant schematic representation of abduction in the current 
literature," what they call the AKM-schema. Gabbay and Woods object to the 
AKM-schema on the grounds that it focuses on explanationist/consequentialist 
abduction, which is at best part of abduction and at worst distorts the true nature of 
abduction. While this discussion is focused on differences of opinion regarding 
the conjecturing of H (part of the engagement process), the rest of the chapter is 
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primarily devoted to a discussion of the cutting down of the candidate space in 
order to arrive at a (hopefully) successful H. 
In Chapter 4, Gabbay and Woods discuss explanationist abduction, i.e., abduction 
in which the cognitive target requires an explanatory H in order to be attained. (The 
AKM-schema is meant to model explanationist abduction.) After a presentation 
and evaluation of Pierce's views on abduction, Gabbay and Woods present various 
competing models of explanation, e.g., covering law, rational, teleological and 
conclude that if inference to the best explanation is evidentially clinching, then it is 
not abductive (since this would violate the ignorance condition)-but Gabbay and 
Woods leave it as an open question whether inference to the best explanation is 
evidentially clinching or not (though they argue that, at the very least, the D-N 
sense of explanation must be sUbjunctive if it is to have a chance of being abductive). 
Chapter 5 is devoted to non-plausibilistic abduction, i.e., abductions in which H 
is a propositionally implausible hypothesis. The main method of explication here is 
via examples from science and logic, e.g., from Newton, Plank, Russell and Godel, 
superstring theory, Lakatos, etc. However, intertwined with these examples is a 
general discussion of such issues as how to understand the consequence relation 
in abductions (it depends on the target), whether semantic tableaux abduction a la 
Aliseda-L1era is really abduction (the authors are skeptical), whether Bayesian 
inference is abductive (it isn't). The main upshot of this chapter seems to be that H 
can be (i) epistemically hopeless (Newton's view on action-at-a-distance) or (ii) 
self-inconsistent or (iii) inconsistent with K. The upshot of (ii) and (iii) is that 
abductive reasoning requires a paraconsistent base logic with a dialethic component. 
In Chapter 6, "Diagnostic Abduction in AI," Gabbay and Woods begin by 
comparing two "representative treatments of diagnostic abduction"-the 
explanationist diagnostic logic AP developed by Josephsen and Josephsen and 
"the parsimonious covering theory" of Peng and Reggia. They then rely on arguments 
of Thagard's, via modeling abduction using probabilistic networks, to suggest that 
probabilistic methods will be inadequate, at least for modeling abductive reasoning 
in practical agents. They finish the chapter with a brief discussion of modeling 
abduction using neural-symbolic networks. This chapter is much more formal than 
any other chapter in this section and generally does not mesh well with the other 
chapters on conceptual models of abduction. 
In Chapters 7 and 8, Gabbay and Woods fill out in somewhat more detail their 
claim from Chapter 3 that cutting down the candidate space of potential hypotheses 
will rely on relevance and plausibility. In particular, they discuss the role that a 
suitable relevance logic plays in reducing the candidate space of solutions for an 
abduction problem to a more manageable set of 'relevant' solutions. They also 
discuss how this set of relevant solutions can be adjudicated via plausibility/ 
implausibility constraints. Once some initial examples are made, to get the (at least) 
intuitive role of these two concepts clear, Gabbay and Woods focus on plausibility 
throughout the rest of the Chapter 7 and turn to relevance in Chapter 8. 
By the end of Chapter 7, Gabbay and Woods postulate a connection between 
what is 'plausible' and what is 'characteristic'-"plausibility then falls out as what 
conforms to what is characteristic, with implausibility contradicting the 
characteristic" (p. 238). They compare their reliance on what is characteristic with 
Rescher's plausibility logic and while admitting that in some respects their approach 
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fares no better, they also claim that their approach will avoid problems of circularity 
and extension to impersonal contexts that bedevil Rescher's approach. 
In the first half of Chapter 8, Gabbay and Woods argue that while standard 
logical treatments of relevance, which treat mostly of propositional relevance (topical 
relevance, full-use abduction, irredundancy-relevance), are too coarse-grained for 
the work that needs to be done in producing a theory of abduction, they also 
suggest that such logics can playa subsidiary role. Ultimately, they argue in favor 
of the view of relevance expounded in the first volume of this series, viz., agenda 
relevance. (I is relevant for X with regard to A to the extent that in processing I, X is 
affected in ways that conduce toward the advancement or closure of A (p. 240).) In 
the second half of the chapter, Gabbay and Woods, discuss legal relevance and 
legal presumption and their ties to abduction. Indeed, the authors present many 
comparisons with legal situations and abduction, without linking the discussion 
back to relevance-hence the chapter does not hang together well as a whole. 
They end the chapter with a discussion of the role of analogy in abduction. 
In Chapter 9, "Interpretation Abduction," Gabbay and Woods focus on 
interpretation problems, especially linguistic interpretation problems, and the degree 
to which these problems are also abduction problems. Their primary cases are 
enthymeme resolution and principles of charity, and they conclude that while text 
interpretation is not intrinsically abductive, there certainly are abductive cases. 
Chapters 10-13 are devoted to setting the groundwork for formal models of 
abduction. Chapter 10 provides some examples and suggests what sort of logical 
apparatus will be needed in order to accommodate the examples. For instance, 
Gabbay and Woods suggest that the logic will have to be defeasible and require a 
labeled deductive system. Chapter 11 provides a general theory of logical systems, 
which, as the authors point out, is "a serious departure from current conceptual 
practice" (p. 366). In particular, they hold that logical systems are not just the sets 
of formulas provable under a given consequence relation, but also the algorithmic 
system used to generate the set of formulas. Hence, a semantic tableaux, a natural 
deduction system, a truth table system for classical propositional logic, would all 
count as different logical systems according to Gabbay and Woods, for even though 
the set of formulas provable is identical in each case, the method of proving the 
formulas is different. Gabbay and Woods go on to modify the set of formulas to be 
structured data such that again the same consequence relation could be involved 
in different logical systems because the systems structure the provable formulas 
differently. They also add mechanisms that "make use of data and algorithms to 
extend data" (p. 380). They maintain that data can also be mechanisms, i.e., 
operations on data, so data need not just have declarative content. Ultimately, they 
maintain that a logical system should be presented as a quadruple, <Consequence 
Relation, Algorithm, Relevance, Mechanisms>. 
In Chapters 12 and 13, Gabbay and Woods turn to formal abduction. After a 
brief introduction to a Labelled Deductive System (see Gabbay, 1996 for more detail), 
Gabbay and Woods show how to begin constructing abduction algorithms for 
such systems, along with numerous examples (though most in the context of 
programming and database interaction). In section 13.2, they define one particular 
abduction algorithm and sketch a proof for its soundness. They conclude with 
some examples of abduction for intuitionistic implications and for relevance logic. 
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Having put forward the mere beginnings of formal models for abduction, they note 
that "proper formal modeling is better done at the end of this series of volumes 
since all the concepts and mechanisms are interdependent"(p. 441). 
The preceding summary provides only the barest outline of much of the book 
and still leaves numerous sections of the book unmentioned. One reason for this 
tremendous breadth can be found in the facts that, as the authors point out right 
from the beginning, (a) there is no dominant theory of abduction and (b) there is "a 
large literature on abduction ... from philosophy, cognitive psychology, computer 
science, artificial intelligence and, of course, logic" (p. xvii-xviii). As a result, there 
is quite a variety of approaches and issues that loosely fall under the abduction 
umbrella-approaches and issues the authors cover, briefly at least, through the 
course of the book. 
Unfortunately, the sheer breadth of discussion is a hindrance to the reader. 
Firstly, the scope of the discussions makes following a coherent path through the 
book extremely difficult, if not impossible. In their bid to be thorough, Gabbay and 
Woods take the reader down many side paths without making it clear to the reader 
what the upshot is for their own theory of abduction. Indeed, precisely picking their 
theory out from the clutter is quite a challenge for the reader. 
Secondly, the result is too many 'first words' where in some cases it would have 
been nice to have gotten some second or third words, especially concerning their 
own proposal. For example, there is no argument for the ignorance-condition (or 
cognitive-deficit condition) on abduction-it is stipulated (repeatedly) and then 
used to argue that many cases of what we thought were abduction are (or perhaps 
might) not really be abduction at all. For example, non-subjunctive deductive-
nomological explanationism and evidentially clinching inference to the best 
explanation are ruled non-abductive because they violate the ignorance-condition. 
But given that Gabbay and Woods accuse the AKM-schema's minimality condition 
on the union of K (the reasoner's knowledge base) and H (the hypothesis put 
forward to achieve the reasoner's goal) of "a contingency elevated to the status of 
a logically necessary condition" (p. 55), one might wonder whether Gabbay and 
Woods are guilty of the same charge with regards to the ignorance-condition. 
Given that so much of what is taken to be examples of abductive behavior is getting 
thrown out, one might doubt the logical necessity of the ignorance condition on 
abduction. Indeed, since Gabbay's and Woods' conception of logic is fundamentally 
a description of the behavior of the agent, why is the fundamental nature of 
abduction resting on the epistemic status of H relative to K and T rather than the 
agent's behavior? At the same time, some may be skeptical of their proposal on the 
grounds that they have so redefined logic and practical agent that they are not 
really solving the original problem of abduction at all. 
Gabbay and Woods claim that part of their project is to get abduction right. 
Evaluating whether they succeed is made even more difficult by the very tentative 
nature of their claims. They call this book their "prologomenon to the logic of 
abduction" (p. 61) and admit that their "own account of abduction is itself abductive" 
(p. 42), i.e., they are putting forth a hypothesis concerning the nature of abduction 
that is a mere conjecture, though a conjecture they are sufficiently confident in to 
release for use in future argumentation. Have they really cut down the candidate 
space to a single proposal? Even if they have, is the hypothesis that remains 
294 
robust enough to warrant being worthy of conjecture? What standards must be 
met in order for the hypothesis to be worthy of conjecture anyway? Without answers 
(or the details necessary to ground the answers) to these questions, whether they 
ought to be confident in their conjecture remains an open question and, given their 
minimal discussion of adjudicating proper from improper abductions, it is impossible 
to tell whether or not they are warranted in their conjecture. 
Finally, unsurprisingly, the conceptual discussion far outstrips the modeling of 
the formal discussion. For example, relative to the issue of 'discovery,' Gabbay and 
Woods point out that "because of the algorithmic nature of the proof theory, it is 
always clear what is locally needed to carry on" (pp. 383-384). In other words, for 
the formal models they consider there is no issue of generating a candidate set-
that is determined by the proof theory. For the formal models, the issue is to provide 
a mechanism for cutting down the candidate space. But in 'real-life' cases there is, 
in many instances, the issue of generating the candidate space in the first place. I 
am surprised to find the door to my office open on a weekend. Wanting to know 
why it is open, I may generate a candidate space that includes, 'I forgot to lock my 
door when I left on Friday,' 'Someone broke into my office,' 'The cleaning staff left 
my door open.' But if, through lack of imagination, I leave out 'The physical plant 
staffleft my door open,' I may be led astray in what I hypothesize as the explanation. 
Indeed, though Gabbay and Woods talk about producing a bona fide logic of 
discovery, they limit most of their discussion (both conceptually and formally) to 
the problem of cutting down the candidate space-yet surely a true 'logic of 
discovery' will need to include mechanisms for discovering a candidate space in 
the first place. 
While there is much that is frustrating in their broad ranging discussion of 
abduction, there is also much to ponder from a variety of perspectives. Gabbay and 
Woods have offered a comprehensive discussion of abduction and made an 
intriguing case for embedding abduction within their quite promising practical logic 
of cognitive systems. Indeed, I strongly suspect that the true merits of their approach 
will be much more evident against the backdrop of a more comprehensive theory of 
practical cognitive systems-but that theory must wait for, at least, the third volume 
in the series. Gabbay and Woods describe this book at one point as "a call to arms 
to the research community" (p. 61). In this they are surely correct. Clearly, there is 
much more work to be done. 
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